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Towards A Legal Framework For Efficiency
and Equity in the Securities Markets
By SHEEN T. KAssouF*
RECENT advances in the analysis of risk-taking and the role of the
securities markets point to prescriptive policy which is often in conflict
with our present legal framework.1 The purpose of this article is to
show that the present judicial and regulatory process imposes inequi-
table costs and inefficiencies on individual investors and on society in
the aggregate. This conclusion is reached by briefly outlining the eco-
nomics of the securities markets, by anatomizing optimal decision-mak-
ing in the face of uncertainty, and by examining the role of the trustee
in the investment process. The focus is on regulation surrounding trust
portfolio investments, since it is here, from the economic point of view,
that a substantial amount of unjustified intervention occurs in the in-
vestment process. Economic analysis can now provide objective criteria
on which to base legislation and judgments. Such criteria should re-
place the widely varying subjective judgments of the courts and agen-
cies.
The Economic Role of the Securities Markets
The virtues of competitive unregulated markets have been known
to economists since Adam Smith.' These virtues obtain as well in
financial markets.' The fundamental virtue, known as the "invisible
hand theorem," states that in free competitive markets if each individ-
ual, uncoerced and guided solely by self-interest, enters into voluntary
* Associate Professor of Economics, University of California, Irvine. The
author is indebted to Ted Wallace and Ned Kassouf for valuable comments and
criticisms.
1. See, e.g., Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE LJ.
1604 (1971); Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HAv. L. REv. 603
(1970).
2. For an elegant diagrammatic exposition of a market economy see Bator,
The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, Am. ECON. Rv., March, 1957, at 22.
3. See W. BAumoL, TaE STOCK MARxT AND ECONOMC EFnCIENCY (1965).
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transactions, then society will arrive at an "optimal state," as if driven
by an invisible hand. An optimal state is one in which no individual
can improve his well-being, except at the expense of another. This
is the essence of economic "efficiency." If, however, an individual's
welfare could be improved at no cost to anyone else, then we would
be in an inefficient state. Although this theorem is the foundation
for the laissez-faire economists, it is now widely recognized, Adam
Smith notwithstanding, that there are at least two reasons why govern-
ment intervention, economic or legal, can be justified.
First, there are an infinite number of optimal states, each corre-
sponding to a different distribution of wealth among society's members.
The theorem is silent in distinguishing between them. Saudi Arabia
and Sweden may both be in optimal economic positions in spite of
widely different distributions of wealth. Similarly, two individuals
within a society may be in optimal economic positions even though
one is wealthy and the other is poor.4 Ethical notions of equality
justify governmental intervention5 in such situations to prevent the un-
even distribution of wealth from proceeding beyond certain limits.
Second, the presuppositions of Smith's theorem may not hold, thus
justifying government intervention. One of the major requirements of
the theorem is the existence of competitive markets. The economic
purpose of antitrust legislation is to insure competitive environments
so that economic efficiency may be achieved. 6 Another presupposi-
tion of the theorem is the absence of "external diseconomies"-no in-
dividual or corporation imposes a harmful effect upon others which
goes uncompensated. The textbook example of an external diseconomy
is a firm's smokestack soiling the laundry of nearby citizens who cannot
recover damages from the firm.'
4. Economists, Marxian and Western, generally believe that the distribution of
wealth becomes increasingly unequal in the early development of "free" industrialized
societies. There is some controversy as to whether this inequality tends to reverse
itself in maturing economies.
For some interesting consequences of primogeniture, patterns of mate selection,
methods of inheritance, differential fertility of different income classes, and other
socioeconomic variables on the distribution of wealth, see Pryor, Simulation of the
Impact of Social and Economic Institutions on the Size Distribution of Income and
Wealth, AM. ECON. REV., March, 1973, at 50.
5. Inheritance and progressive income taxes are the usual instruments used to
achieve a more egalitarian distribution.
6. To be sure, these regulations and their enforcement are concerned to
some extent with distributional inequities and the fear that some individuals and
corporations would become too wealthy or powerful.
7. For an excellent introduction to Adam Smith's theorem and its implications
see E. MIsAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS (1964). The problem of "public goods," closely
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Except for regulation relating to the enforcement of contracts, in-
tervention in the market process by legal or governmental authorities
can be economically justified only if it is designed to correct a distri-
butional inequity or to compensate for externalties. In the absence
of inequities and externalities, an unhindered, competitive financial
market will ensure that society's savings are directed to the most pro-
ductive uses. Stock prices signal to entrepreneurs the cost of capital.
Individual investors, guided by the future potential earnings of a corpo-
ration and seeking to maximize their expected future well-being, will
tend to move society to an optimal state. The remainder of this article
will examine the investment decision-making process and some regula-
tory and judicial interventions that do not seem justified on grounds
of equity or economics.
The Definition and Measurement of Risk-Attitudes
It is apparent that individuals have widely differing preferences
when faced with risky alternatives: a widow may choose a government
bond which is shunned by the young executive. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern in their seminal work' have shown that under certain cir-
cumstances an individual's risk-attitude may be summarized in a rela-
tively simple way. This simple summary describes an individual's pref-
erences in any conceivable situation. Two of their assumptions are:
(1) when faced with two risky alternatives, A and B, an individual
always has a distinct preference for one, or finds them equally desir-
able; and (2) for any three risky alternatives, A, B, and C, if the
individual prefers A to B and B to C then he prefers A to C. An
individual satisfying these two assumptions9 is said to have consistent,
transitive preferences and is occasionally characterized as "rational."
The power of the resulting measure of risk-attitude springs from the
fact that it can finely and objectively distinguish preferences among
individuals, as opposed to the almost meaningless broad categories now
used by many, such as, "aggressive, seeks large gains," or "cautious,
seeks presevation of capital," or "seeks moderate gains consistent with
preservation of capital." These latter, almost meaningless, definitions
of risk-attitude often lead to tortured, sententious arguments reminis-
cent of philsophical debate concerning the number of angels that can
dance on the head of a pin.
related to externalities, is discussed in Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a
Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 350 (1955).
8. J. VON NutmANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAmES AND EONOMIC
BEHAvIoR (1944).
9. Other assumptions are required to derive their conclusions, but these two
are the most important.
Consider an investor whose present wealth is unity (starting wealth
may always be measured as 1.0 by the choice of appropriate units),
who is faced with three alternatives:
1. Make no investment; end of period total wealth will remain
1.0 with certainty;
2. Invest in project A which will result in total wealth of 1.2 or
0.9 with equal probability, that is total wealth will be either
augmented 20 percent or diminished 10 percent;
3. Invest in project B which will result in total wealth of 1.8 or
0.5 with equal probability, that is total wealth will be either
augmented 80 percent or diminished 50 percent.
In making the choice, one might be tempted to calculate the "expected"
wealth of each alternative. The expected, or actuarial wealth of these
alternatives is 1.00, 1.05, and 1.15 respectively.'0 If the reader ranks
these three alternatives according to his own preferences, however,
he may discover that, like many investors, he resists ranking alterna-
ives on an actuarial basis. In fact, a not insignificant proportion of
individuals might prefer (1) to (2) and (2) to (3), completely revers-
ing the order of expected values, and perhaps a majority would prefer
(2) to (1) and (1) to (3). Thus, risk attitudes may vary substan-
tially among individuals.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern have shown that each "rational"
individual chooses among risky alternatives as if he associated with each
possible wealth outcome a number called the utility of wealth, and
that he treats this quantity as the subjective value of wealth." Figure
1 diagrams a possible utility function of wealth for an individual in-
vestor. 2 Note that greater wealth has greater utility (or loosely speak-
ing, well-being) but that the increase in utility diminishes with each
unit increase in wealth. Intuitively, one would expect that a one dollar
10. The expected value of an alternative is the average outcome if the alternative
is pursued repeatedly.
11. We are making two simplifying assumptions here. One, time is divided into
two periods, now and later. Two, satisfaction is derived from wealth. Excepting
Midas-types, whose love of money Keynes found a somewhat disgusting morbidity, the
satisfaction from wealth is derived from the more fundamental preference for consump-
tion goods. For an explicit introduction of a multi-period analysis and the use of
consumption rather than wealth see Samuelson, Lifetime Portfolio Selection by Dynamic
Stochastic Programming, 51 Rav. ECON. & STAT. 239 (1969).
12. The particular utility function shown in Figure 1 is the natural logarithm of
wealth. This function is used in this article as a convenient example. Different
investors, of course, will have different utility functions. The natural logarithm
function can be justified for an investor whose goal is a long term growth of assets.
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increase in wealth would yield less and less satisfaction as one becomes
wealthier. Of course, an individual may not consciously associate with
each wealth level a number called the utility of that level, but if his
choices are consistent and transitive, then an outside observer would
not be able to distinguish his behavior from one who does consciously
calculate expected utility.
FIGURE 1
An Individual Investor's Utility Function
0 2 3 4
Wealth
It is relatively easy to construct a close approximation to an indi-
vidual's utility function.13 With such a construct, it is then possible
to rank any set of alternatives, no matter how complicated. Using
the utility function of Figure 1, the expected utilities of the three alter-
natives discussed above are 1 X 0 = 0, /2(0.1823) + 1/2(-0.1054
= 0.0385, and 1/2(0.5878) + 'h(-0.6931) - -0.0527, respectively,
so that this individual prefers alternative (2) to alternative (1), and
13. See S. KAssou1, NORMATiE DECISION MAIrNG 25-44 (1970); H. RAIFFA, DE-
CiSION ANALysis 51-103 (1968).
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alternative (1) to alternative (3), and of course, alternative (2) to
(3).
Now consider a fourth alternative: investment in project C will
result in wealth of 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, or 2.0 each with probability
of 1/5. The expected utility of this last alternative is 1/5 X utility of
0.5 + 1/5 X utility of 0.75 + . .•. + -1/5 X utility of 2.0 =
1/5(-0.6931) + /5(-0.2897) + 1 (0) + Y5s(0.4055) + /s(0.6931)
= 0.0236. Thus the four alternatives would be ranked in this de-
scending order: (2), (4), (1), (3).
To summarize the economic view of risk-attitudes: if an individ-
ual has consistent transitive preferences, his risk-attitude can be accu-
rately defined by a utility function. This function varies among indi-
viduals, and spans a continuum ranging from a function which de-
scribes an ultraconservative individual to a function which describes
one who is hopelessly risk-loving.
The Definition and Measurement of Expectations
The discussion so far has centered on an individual's risk-attitude
and its quantification. In this calculation probabilities have been used
as if they were given. In the real world, unlike the casino, these prob-
abilities are objectively unknown and are subjectively determined.
(What is the probability that General Motors stock will be $100 per
share one year from today?) Just as they differ in their subjective
evaluation of wealth, investors will differ substantially in their evalua-
tion of the prospects for General Motors, even if they are provided
with the same information. An investor's evaluation of the future
prospects of an investment is called his expectation. Many security
analysts use vague language in describing their expectations ("I think
it will go above 100," or, "I don't like the stock, I think it will go
lower"). Nevertheless, it can be shown 4 that if an individual's pref-
erences are consistent and transitive among choices where probabilities
are not given, he behaves as if he assigns a detailed probability distri-
bution similar to Figure 2. Figure 2 might describe an investor's ex-
pectations for General Motors stock one year from today. He con-
siders a wide span of possible outcomes, ranging from 20 to 120, and
with each outcome he associates a probability. Generally, the more
detailed his knowledge, the more detailed this distribution.
14. See S. KASSouF, NORMATIVE DECISION MAKING 45-54 (1970); H. RAIFFA,
DECISION ANALYSIS 157-187 (1968).
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FiGUmI 2
Subjective Price Expectations for General Motors Stock
.15-
J0 I
0.L .05-
0 U-)o0 Lco OLO 'Lo 0 o _O0 OD
Price General Motors One Year From Today
Using an investor's distribution to describe his expectations for
an investment, it can be seen that there are an infinite number of grada-
tions over a continuum ranging from very risky to completely without
risk. With these measures of expectations, the usually ill-defined
phrases "probable safety of an investment," and "the probable loss as-
sociated with an investment," can now be quantified. The distinction
between an investment and a speculation, which has fruitlessly occu-
pied many, can now be left to metaphysicians.
The economist's view of decision-making under uncertainty may
be summarized in this manner: (1) if an investor's preferences among
risky alternatives are consistent and transitive, then he is behaving, con-
sciously or not, as if he placed subjective values on differing future
wealth levels; (2) he makes subjective probabilistic estimates of future
outcomes; (3) he implements his probability estimates to maximize
his expected future well-being.
Although many do not believe that individuals have consistent,
transitive preferences, and claim instead that much of investment be-
15. For a thorough review of the empirical research in the capital markets which
tends to validate this view of decision-making, see Jensen, Capital Markets, 3 BELL I.
EcoN. & MANAGEMENT ScIENcE 357 (1972).
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havior is impetuous or whimsical, recent research indicates that the
economic model closely approximates actual behavior. 1" Indeed, if
one rejects the economist's view entirely, one must conclude that indi-
viduals (and investors in particular), do not "know their own minds,"
make inconsistent choices, and/or do not experience distinct levels of
well-being with differing levels of expected future wealth.
It is important to note here that even if all investors are "rational"
in the Von Neumann and Morgenstern sense, modem financial markets
may preclude the necessary conditions for the invisible hand theorem.
Therefore, intervention by regulation may be necessary to move society
to an optimum. This need may arise from the fact that sophisticated
present day markets provide investors with abundant "liquidity," or
the opportunity to change the nature of their asset holdings at relatively
little cost with great speed. If this available liquidity dominates in-
vestors' expectations, shifting their concern from the long run to the
immediate short run, then asset prices may no longer have any
relation to their future potential earnings. When investors behave this
way, prices take on a life of their own with little or no connection
to the future earnings potential of the companies involved. This is
a subtle externality which severely distorts the flow of savings, and
which results in some enterprises receiving funds that can be better
utilized by other more efficient firms. Keynes observed this tendency
almost four decades ago, and it is worth quoting his famous passage
in detail:
[P]rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper com-
petitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest
faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the
competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the aver-
age preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each com-
petitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest,
but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other
competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the
same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to
the best of one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those
which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have
reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to an-
ticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.',
After discussing investment behavior in the United States during
the 1920's, Keynes is led to observe: "There is no clear evidence from
experience that the investment policy which is socially advantageous
coincides with that which is most profitable."' 7  If, at various times,
16. J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY
156 (1936).
17. Id. at 157.
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investors do not seem in fact to be guided by the earnings of an invest-
ment over its total life, intervention by regulatory and legislative bodies
may be justified. Inducements such as preferential taxation of long
term capital gains, and discouragements such as higher transaction
costs are possible means of intervention.
The Optimal Ex Ante Portfolio
An investor concerned with his expected total future wealth, does
not view securities in isolation, but rather in combinaton. To illustrate
this, consider a simple two-security world where security A has two
equally likely outcomes, a gain of 15 percent or a loss of 5 percent,
and security B with equally likely outcomes of a gain of 20 percent
or a loss of 10 percent. The investor's problem is not simply choosing
between A and B; it is choosing that combination of A and B which
maximizes his expected future well-being. Simplifying further, as-
sume that the outcomes of both securities are tied in this manner: if
A returns 15 percent, B will lose 10 percent; if A loses 5 percent,
B will gain 20 percent. Let p be the proportion of wealth that an
investor places in A and 1-p the proportion in B. Then a portfolio
of A and B will yield a terminal wealth of either 0.90+ 0.2 5p or
1.20 -0. 2 5 p.'8 A mathematical calculation shows that an investor with
the utility function of Figure 1 will choose p =0.6,11 so that with
60 percent of his wealth in A and 40 percent in B, his terminal wealth
will be 1.05 with certainty. This example characterizes a "hedged"
transaction. Security A might represent a convertible bond and secu-
rity B the short sale of an appropriate number of common shares into
which the bond may be converted."0
The problem quickly becomes more complicated with the addition
of more securities whose outcomes are not perfectly related. In gen-
eral, the outcomes of securities are not perfectly related as in the above
18. The terminal wealth is simply the initial wealth plus the increase or decrease
associated with each stock in the portfolio. Thus, where A gains 15 percent and B
loses 10 percent, the terminal wealth is:
Terminal Wealth = 1.0 + p (.15) - (1 - p) (.1) - 0.9 + .25p.
Similarly, where A loses 5 percent and B gains 20 percent:
Terminal Wealth = 1.0 - p(.05) + (1 -p) (.2) = 1.2 - .25p.
19. This result is reached by maximizing the expected utility with respect to p.
Since Figure 1 represents the natural logarithm of wealth, the expected utility U is:
U = 1/ [ln(0.90 + .25p) + ln(1.20 - 0.25p)].
The value of p for which U is maximized is obtained by taking the derivative of
U with respect to p, setting the result equal to zero, and solving for p.
20. For explicit examples of these kinds of investments see S. KASSOUF, EVALUA-
TION OF CONV RTIBLE SEcumurms (1962).
example. However, security prices do tend to be positively related:
when conditions are favorable for General Motors, they are generally
favorable for other auto companies, and for tire companies, and with
less certainty, for other corporations. The strength of these co-rela-
tionships varies greatly. The principal of diversification is based upon
these differing relationships. Blending various securities in differing
proportions gives rise to a portfolio whose probability distribution will
differ from those of each of the component securities. It is the re-
sultant probability distribution of the portfolio which is of relevance
to an individual's welfare, not the characteristics of any isolated com-
ponent. An individual component very often may have undesirable
characteristics when viewed in isolation, but which nevertheless makes
a useful contribution by modifying the portfolio's characteristics. Vin-
egar in isolation is not an appealing food, but as a component of
a salad it may be very valuable indeed.
This is the portfolio problem with which the modem theory of
finance deals. 21 In spite of its complexity, its solution is feasible. There
is a large and growing body of literature outlining relatively simple ap-
proximations to the exact solution. 22  An individual investor can now
answer a series of relatively simple questions and a computer program
will then infer both his risk-attitude and his expectations, and will pro-
vide him with his optimal portfolio. Our interest here, however, is with
trusteed investments, the problem to which we now turn.
The "New" Role of the Trustee
The investment decision for a substantial amount of assets is not
made by the beneficial owners. Trustees, guided by trust instruments,
legislation, and judicial rulings, direct a large and growing proportion
of this country's assets.2 3 Even if externalities or distributional inequi-
ties did not exist, this separation of investment decision from the bene-
ficial owner may preclude society from arriving at an optimal position.
If trustees are unaware of their beneficiaries' preferences, or if they
are impeded by law or custom from seeking optimal portfolios, then
serious inefficiencies and inequities may be imposed on individual bene-
ficiaries and on society in the aggregate.
21. Sce H. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION (1959).
22. See, e.g., Jensen, Capital Markets, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT 357
(1972).
23. 1 SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT (Supp. 1971). See especially
id. Appendix I, table 22, at 307-08.
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Most trust instruments do not sharply define investment powers;
consequently, trustees look to legislatures and the judiciary for invest-
ment standards. The central theme of these standards has evolved
from Justice Putnam's 1830 decision,24 which announced the "prudent
mai" rule:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall con-
duct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to
observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable in-
come, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested. 25
Almost a century and a half later, this vague rule, with no opera-
tional definition of "prudence," "discretion," "speculation," and "safety,"
still dominates the behavior of trustees. It has become a shield be-
hind which trustees often take shelter. Instead of being concerned
with the welfare of beneficiaries, trustees point to the rule as justi-
fication for restricting their activities to relatively few investment
alternatives.2 6 It is no surprise that bank trust departments tend to
concentrate massive amounts of assets in relatively few stocks. 7 This
behavior serves neither the beneficiaries nor society. This investment
decision process, centered on the avoidance of surcharge and restricted
to lists of stocks considered above suspicion (lists sometimes num-
bering less than 200 issues), can be almost perfectly simulated by com-
puter.2 It strongly implies that many trustees do not seek optimal
portfolios uniquely associated with each beneficiary, but instead,
cloaked in the prudent man rule, attempt to avoid criticism. "Worldly
wisdom," Keynes wrote, "teaches that it is better for reputation to fail
conventionally than to succeed unconventionally."2
24. Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830), cited in Note,
The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 H.av. L. REv. 603, 612 (1970).
25. Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).
26. For an eloquent statement cautioning trustees see Miller, Without Precedent,
111 TRUSTS & ESTATES 874, 924 (1972), where he writes "neither can you remove a
wrong to a beneficiary by saying that, because of some technicality, you owe him no
duty." Ironically, Mr. Dean E. Miller, the Deputy Comptroller of the Currency for
trusts, in his position with regard to options, stands behind technicalities based upon ir-
relevant legal precedents. See note 40 infra.
27. See 1 SEC, INSTrToTIONAL INVSTOR STUDY REPORT 215-22 (Supp. 1971).
The Wall Street Journal reported that the largest bank trust department in the country,
with $27.44 billion in trust assets on December 31, 1972, had 56 percent or $12.14
billion invested in 31 stocks. Wall Street Journal, May 24, 1973, at 8, col. 1.
28. P. CLARKSON, PORTFOLIo SELECTION: A SImULATION OF TRUST INvEsXmENT
(1962).
29. J. KLY , THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYNIENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY
158 (1936).
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Given the economist's view of the investment process, how might
a trustee proceed when charged with the power to direct investments?
First, the beneficiary's risk-attitude should be determined as explicitly
as possible. For an individual beneficiary this is relatively simple, and
can be elicited by having the individual make simple choices from hy-
pothetical alternatives.3" When the beneficiary is a group, or when
the beneficiary is incapable of expressing "intelligent" preferences, such
as a child, the trustee should be guided by the preferences of the trustor;
in the absence of that possibility, the trustee should explicitly impute
a well-defined risk-attitude which he can defend on the basis of custom
and logic. This choice of risk-attitude might at some time be subject
to post-audit criticism but at least the trustee will not be defending
shadowy and slippery notions of "prudence" and "safety." In time,
the courts or the legislature may develop appropriate utility functions
for various classes of beneficiaries who are unable to provide their
OWn.
3 1
In addition to the beneficiary's risk-attitude, expectations for the
various investment alternatives are required for the trustee to construct
an optimal portfolio. 2 The trustee will make his largest contribution
in analyzing these alternatives. Informed judgments about future pos-
sibilities result from close study of particular corporations, their posi-
tion in an industry, the industry's evolving role in the economy, the
possible impact of fiscal and monetary policy, the possibility and effect
of government intervention, the influence of international develop-
ments, etc. Linking these expectations (which can be expressed quan-
titatively, as in Figure 2) to the beneficiary's utility function will then
generate an optimal portfolio. As expectations are revised with un-
folding events, the portfolio is revised.
This procedure has clear advantages: trustees will be free to max-
imize beneficiaries' well-being; society will benefit as savings are chan-
neled to the most productive uses; clear standards will exist to judge
the investment performance of trustees. The question of negligence,
or improper investment behavior, can be judged more scientifically.
30. See H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968).
31. The utility function in Figure 1 can be justified for beneficiaries whose
goal is long term growth of assets, e.g., children who will not draw upon the assets for
some extended period of time.
32. The notion of an optimal portfolio, of course, does not imply that it will
achieve the highest gains. An optimal portfolio may well experience a drastic loss, just
as a foolish investment may reap large gains. The optimal portfolio will vary among
beneficiaries, depending upon each beneficiary's risk-attitude and price expectations for
the portfolio.
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Consider, for example, the suit brought by Hanover College against
Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jennrette (DLJ).3  The college alleged that
DLI made some improper investments when, acting as investment ad-
visor with discretionary powers, they purchased 16 common stocks
which were "unseasoned, speculative, volatile and risky," and sustained
losses of $2.4 million. The College sought damages equal to these
losses, in spite of the fact that these 16 stocks represented a small
portion of the entire portfolio and that the portfolio taken as a whole
increased in value 25 percent, a better performance than the Standard
& Poor's 500 stock average over the same four year period. In evaluat-
ing the college's allegation, it is not sufficient to cite the losses sustained
on the purchase of any one, or even of any subset, of the securities
purchased. The characteristics of the entire portfolio must be judged.
Because securities interact with one another, a portfolio is something
more than the sum of its parts. The expectations that a trustee may
have for a portfolio (expressed as a probability distribution similar
to Figure 2) may not be achievable by any individual security. The
example above illustrating an optimal ex ante portfolio, for example,
shows that individual securities A and B have distributions which indi-
cate a possibility of loss in each security, whereas a portfolio of these
two securities yields a distribution that will not experience a loss.3 4 Al-
though this case is extreme (but not impossible) it demonstrates the
complementary effect that securities may have upon each other.
The proper method of judging this allegation would be to deter-
mine whether DLJ imputed the correct utility function to the college
and whether DLJ's ex ante expectations were soundly based. This
judgment procedure eliminates the danger of judging ex ante expecta-
tions by ex poste results. It also eliminates the danger of judgments
that confound the use of an improper risk-attitude ("DLJ took too
much risk") with faulty and negligent expectations ("DLJ had no basis
for believing the stock had a small probability for such a large de-
cline"). Too often judgments are unduly influenced by the outcome
of investments, and tend to be asymmetrical. Thus "poor" outcomes
are criticized and "good" outcomes are praised.3 5 Now, with objective
33. See Belliveau, Is Discretionary Management of Pension Funds in Jeopardy,
PENSIONS, Spring, 1972, at 47-50. This suit was subsequently settled out of court.
34. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
35. Arnold Bernhard recounts an incident contrary to this usual practice. In the
late 1920's, a leading industrialist turned over a million dollars to Jesse Livermore
with the instructions to invest it. After six months, the industrialist discharged Liver-
more when he found his million dollars had almost doubled. He informed Livermore
measures of risk-attitudes and expectations, it is possible to neglect
the irrelevant outcome of an investment when judging the ex ante be-
havior of trustees.
The Regulatory Agencies
At present there are many legal impediments to optimal invest-
ment behavior on the part of trustees. Two such problems are ex-
amined briefly below.
The Comptroller of the Currency, supervisor of the trust depart-
ments of national banks, requires that "funds held. . . in a fiduciary ca-
pacity shall be invested in accordance with the instrument establishing
the fiduciary relationship and local law."'36 The Comptroller's position
is that absent a provision in the trust instrument allowing the selling of
options, local law will control.3 7  Local law, either by statute3 8 or case
law," ostensibly prohibits the use of options as speculative devices.
This prohibition is based upon decisions40 involving questions of fact
that anyone who doubled his investments in six months was obviously taking too much
risk.
36. 12 C.F.R. § 9.11(a) (1973).
37. See Kuhn, Using Call Options to Improve Trust Investment Performance,
111 TRUSTS & ESTATES 250, 295 (1973).
38. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 2261 (West Supp. 1973); ORE. REv. STAT. §
128.020 (1953). Connecticut recently enacted legislation authorizing the selling of call
options for state trust funds. Conn. Pub. Act No. 73-594 (June 11, 1973).
39. E.g., Fraser v. Farmers' Co-op, 167 Minn. 369, 209 N.W. 33 (1926); Whors-
ley v. Patton-Kjose Co., 90 Mont. 461, 5 P.2d 210 (1931). See generally 38 C.J.S.
Gaming § 1 (1943); Annot. 83 A.L.R. 522 (1933).
40. The position of the Comptroller is set forth in Deputy Comptroller Dean E.
Miller's letter to Sheen Kassouf, June 19, 1972:
"This is in reply to your letter of June 13 and in further reference to this Office's
position relating to the writing of options by national banks on behalf of trust accounts.
We have now completed our inquiry in this area and have come to the conclusion,
reluctantly, that we cannot change our position. This is based primarily upon the ob-
servation that the law of trusts has not changed to the point that we could say with
assurance that a bank engaging in this activity would be free from the risk of accusation
of breach of fiduciary duty. As you know, Regulation 9 does not make the law as to
what is and what is not a breach of trust-it merely incorporates the laws of the states
in this regard. We have not found sufficient evidence that the law has been
changed through court decision or legislative enactment in the various states, so that we
can conclude that the cases in this area would not apply to any form of option trans-
action. We note that Mr. Walter Barton in his treatise on this subject came to some-
what the same conclusion as to the legal question." It is difficult to understand the
statement that Barton "came to somewhat the same conclusion,"--that Barton sup-
ported the Comptroller's blanket prohibition against "any form of option transaction"
by trustees. Indeed, Barton concluded the opposite in his closing remarks on legality.
W. Barton, Writing Puts and Calls as an Investment for Trusts 72, August 1971 (Na-
tional Graduate Trust School, Northwestern University). Contrary to his own sage
advice to trust officers, note 26 supra, the Comptroller has here seen fit to rely
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which have no present relation to the use of options as an investment
technique for bank trust departments. The irrationality of the Comp-
troller's stance can be seen by considering a simple example of a trust
officer faced with the following two alternatives:
(1) Buy 100 shares of Ford Motor Co. for a trusteed account.
This noncontroversial strategy is available to almost all
trust officers. The common stock is presently on the "ap-
proved list" of most major bank trust departments.
(2) Buy 100 shares of Ford Motor Co. and simultaneously sell
a call option on these shares.
Assume that at the time these two alternatives are available, the
price of the common stock is 60 and the premium that the seller of
the option would receive for a six-month option is 7.5. The trust
officer pursuing alternative (1) would realize a gain on this investment
if the common stock moved up and would show a loss if the common
stock fell in price. In contrast, the trust officer following alternative
(2) would show no loss unless the common stock fell more than 7.5
points. (This example neglects all transaction costs.) Alternative (2)
is superior to alternative (1) for every outcome where the common
stock, six months from purchase, sells for less than 67.5. The follow-
ing table shows the profit or loss for each alternative, dependent upon
the price of Ford Motor Co. common stock six months after pur-
chase:
Final price Profit from Profit from
of Ford alternative 1 alternative 2
45 -15 -7.5
50 -10 -2.5
55 - 5 ±2.5
60 0 ±7.5
65 + 5 ±7.5
70 +10 +7.5
75 +15 +7.5
Selling the call option reduces the variability of possible return,
thus making the investment more stable than an outright purchase.
on precedent contained in the cases cited by Barton. Examination of these cases
shows them to be irrelevant to the question posed. This distortion of the use of
precedent arises because the Comptroller fails to distinguish between options on securi-
ties vs. options on commodities, real estate, oil, gas and mining interests; between those
who buy them and those who sell them; between those who sell them without owning
the underlying securities and those who do. This illustrates the problems cited in Note,
Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARv. L. REv. 603, 613 (1970):
"First, when an investment was held improper in one case, courts often treated
the question of fact in that case as a question of law, and the case became precedent
holding that no investment of that type was proper. Second, courts often treated rules
they established as universal rules, even though prudence is dependent on the time and
place of making an investment."
This result can hardly be considered inappropriate, especially when this
reduced variability is often accompanied by larger expected return.4 1
Thus if a security is considered an appropriate investment in and of
itself, the simultaneous sale of an option can hardly be considered "im-
prudent."4
This is not a trivial matter. Recent research43 indicates that the
use of options is a necessary condition to ensure an efficient capital
market. By the blanket prohibition of any option investments by trus-
tees on behalf of beneficiaries, the comptroller has impeded economic
efficiency: many individuals can increase their well-being without a
concomitant decrease in anyone else's, and society in the aggregate
(including noninvestors) is prevented from achieving an optimal state.
Another instance of regulatory interference involves the Federal
Reserve Board, which is empoweed by the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to set federal margin requirements.44 Pursuant to this act,
the Board issued Regulation T45 prescribing the terms and amounts
of credit which brokers are permitted to grant to margin account cli-
ents.
An investment opportunity often arises which requires the short
sale of a security.46 For technical reasons involving the receipt and
delivery of securities, virtually all short sales must take place in margin
accounts at brokers who are bound by Regulation T. This regulation
prescribes that when a short sale takes place, the client must deposit
with the broker appropriate collateral consisting either of securities or
cash.17  Since trust law in many states forbids the trustee to relinquish
41. See Optimal Investment Strategies and an Organized Option Market, Address
by B.G. Malkiel, New York Society of Security Analysts, October 26, 1972 (published
by the Chicago Board Options Exchange).
42. In private discussions with the Deputy Comptroller for Trusts, he made clear
that this prohibition of the use of options in trust accounts was based upon court deci-
sions and that the questions of fact treated in these decisions indicated to him that any
investment involving options was improper. In spite of the compelling logic that options
per se need not be speculative devices, he stated that trust departments seeking relief
should look not to the Comptroller's Office, but to the courts or the legislatures. This
perhaps is not too surprising since the Comptroller has no incentive to amend his in-
terpretation of Regulation 9, if in his estimation there is the slightest chance he can
be criticized, since there is no apparent direct benefit to his Office. See also note 40
supra.
43. E.L. Schrems, The Sufficiency of Existing Financial Instruments for Pareto
Optimal Risk Allocation, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1973.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970).
45. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1973).
46. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
47. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(b) (1973).
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the custody of any of the assets in the trust,48 short sales are a forbid-
den technique for trust investments.
The Board was asked to allow brokers to execute short sales on
behalf of national bank trust departments if the trustee, in lieu of the
required cash or securities, deposited with the broker a representation
that he held, and would continue to hold while the short position was
not covered, the required collateral. This would not violate the intent
of Regulation T: it would only change the location of the collateral
required for the short sale.
The Board rejected this reques49 citing "possible evasions" which
might occur, i.e., bank trust departments might enter into short
sales without holding the appropriate collateral. Thus the fear that
bank trust departments, which are subject to severe judicial sanction
for improper investment behavior, might violate margin requirements
if given the opportunity, led an agency of the government to preclude
certain trustees from achieving an optimal portfolio on behalf of their
beneficiaries. In addition to this fear of violation, the Board is appar-
ently still influenced by the position of its Governors in 1937:
[T]raders on the short side of the market should not be in a posi-
tion, with a given amount of funds, to exert a greater influence
on the market than they could with the same amount of funds if
they were trading on the long side. 50
Short selling thus is viewed in isolation rather than as a possible
device which under certain circumstances will reduce risk. Short sell-
ing per se, with no regard to the circumstances that might make it
acceptable from the point of view of the individual and society, 1 is
thus considered a technique which should not be encouraged, and
which should be made impossible for certain investors.
Conclusion
An individual's optimal portfolio is determined by his risk-attitude
and his expectations. If each individual invests in order to achieve
his optimal portfolio, then under very general conditions, society in
48. See 4 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 537 (P. Rohan ed. 1971);
2, 3 A. ScoTr, LAw OF TRUSTS §§ 175, 186, 188.1 (3rd ed. 1967).
49. Personal correspondence, June 30, 1972.
50. Cited by the Board in its February 20, 1973 interpretation of Part 220, Regu-
lation T. Treatment of Put and Call Options and Combinations Thereof as Securities,
38 Fed. Reg. 5237 (1973).
51. For an empirical and theoretical examination of short selling which indicates
that this technique may be beneficial to financial markets see F. MAcAuLAY, SHORT
SELLiNa ON THE NEw YORK STOCK EXCHMNGE (1951).
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the aggregate will also achieve its optimum position. It is therefore
important that each investor be allowed to pursue his self-interest with-
out legal restriction, except in those instances where legal or govern-
mental intervention is justified, either to correct an inequitable distribu-
tion of wealth or to correct the existence of economic externalities.
Whenever an individual's portfolio is determined indirectly by an
intermediary such as a trustee, objective criteria exist to judge whether
or not an optimal portfolio was in fact achieved. These criteria can
be quantified. With these objective measures the courts can readily
determine negligence or improper behavior on the part of trustees.
Furthermore, regulatory agencies and legislative bodies, guided
by the decision-making process outlined above, can provide the envi-
ronment necessary for achieving economic efficiency. Impediments
and restrictions to the investment process can then be justified on equi-
table or economic grounds and not on what often appears to be pa-
ternalistic and elitist considerations.
